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Introduction 
On June 15, 2013, ten-year-old Sarah Murnaghan underwent a 
successful bilateral lung transplant.1 The fact that Sarah underwent a 
lung transplant is not a unique event or an astounding breakthrough 
in modern medicine or science.2 What makes Sarah’s story unique is 
how she received her lung transplant. Since December 2011, Sarah 
had been on the waiting list for child-donated lungs. Because she was 
under twelve years old, Sarah was placed on only the pediatric list, 
 
1. Pennsylvania: Transplant Recipient Gets Second Set of New Lungs, 
Associated Press, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2013, at A11. This was not 
Sarah Murnaghan’s first lung transplant. She received a bilateral lung 
transplant, a complete set of lungs rather than a single lung, from an 
adult donor on June 12, 2013. This initial transplant failed almost 
immediately after surgery. Id. 
2. Maryam Valapour et al., OPTN/SRTR Annual Data Report: Lung, 
2012 OPTN/SRTR Ann. Data Rep. 139, at 140–41, 150 fig. 3.1. In 
2012, 1,783 individuals received lung transplants, compared with fewer 
than 1,000 individuals in 1998, and as of June 30, 2012, there were more 
than 10,000 Americans living with a lung transplant. Id.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Judge Put Me on the List 
182 
meaning that she would get priority on child-donated lungs but would 
be at the very bottom of the list of candidates for adult-donated 
lungs.3 In May 2013, Sarah’s condition began to decline rapidly, and 
she was admitted to the ICU at the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia. Concerned that nothing would be done in time to save 
their child, the Murnaghans started a petition asking Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, to set aside the 
under-12 rule for lung transplants.4 The petition called for the 
OPTN/UNOS lung review board to make an exception for Sarah and 
consider the validity of the under-12 rule as it applies to all children 
seeking lung transplants.5 In late May 2013, Secretary Sebelius 
consulted with the President of the OPTN (Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network) Board of Directors, Dr. John Roberts, but 
as of June 5, the Secretary had not taken any formal action in Sarah’s 
case.6 Due to the lack of response, Sarah’s parents filed a complaint 
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunctive relief in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
on June 5, 2013. The complaint sought judicial review of OPTN’s 
under-12 rule for lung transplants and a TRO suspending the policy 
as it applied to Sarah.7 The TRO was granted8 and Sarah was allowed 
to go on the adult transplant list, where she quickly received a set  
of lungs.9  
Sarah has since returned home and continues to improve.  But 
the circumstances surrounding her lung transplant raise many legal 
and ethical questions, particularly about whether a judge should be 
the one to determine that the protocol is inefficient and therefore 
interfere in OPTN procedures to temporarily dictate the agency’s 
policy. More fundamentally, this case raises questions about who 
should review and how they should review agency actions when 
 
3. Complaint for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and 
Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 31–32, Murnaghan v. Sebelius, 13-CV-
03083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013). 
4. Allow Transplants of Adult Lungs to Children, Change.org, http:// 
www.change.org/petitions/optn-unos-change-policy-to-allow-pediatric-
transplants-of-adult-lungs-based-on-medical-necessity (last visited Aug. 
30, 2014).  
5. Id.  
6. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 46. 
7. Id. ¶ 63.  
8. Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Murnaghan v. 
Sebelius, 13-CV-03083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013). 
9. Change.org, supra note 4. Sarah received her new lungs quickly 
because she had an extremely high LAS (lung allocation score), which 
determines placement on the adult lung transplant list.  
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private, non-government actors run the agency. Moreover, it raises 
questions of whether non-government actors should even administer 
these agencies and what must be done with time-sensitive issues such 
as organ transplantation.10  
This Note advocates a hybrid policy that uses judicial review for 
immediate remedies to agency decisions made by private actors but 
allows the agency to determine if any long-term reforms to the 
protocol should be made and what the nature of those reforms should 
be. Part I discusses the legal framework surrounding the creation of 
OPTN as well as why the privatization of OPTN is justified. Part II 
examines agency accountability through the use of judicial review and 
examines the OPTN regulations using these judicial review rationales. 
Lastly, using the Murnaghan case as a framework, Part III advocates 
a solution to cases like that of Sarah Murnaghan, for which judicial 
review of the agency determination is used along with deference to 
decision making by the private, non-government agency, creating a 
hybrid method for generating timely solutions that are effective for 
the petitioner but also recognize that policy decisions creating long-
term changes should be left to the agency. 
I. Privatization of Public Government Functions 
A. The National Organ Transplant Act 
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ and Transplant Act 
(NOTA).11 The Act “called for a singular transplant network to be 
operated by a non-profit organization under federal contract.”12 The 
Act grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to 
make a grant in order to establish a qualified organ procurement 
organization.13 This qualified organization must be a non-profit, must 
be fiscally stable or have procedures to insure fiscal stability, and 
must be certified within the four years prior to the Act “as meeting 
the performance standards of a qualified organ procurement 
organization.”14 This organ procurement agency is called the Organ 
 
10. OPTN is a government agency created under the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) but operated by the non-profit United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). HRSA, About OPTN, OPTN: 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http:// 
optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).  
11. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–74 (2012)); HRSA, History, OPTN: 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http:// 
optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/history.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter History].  
12. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).  
13. Id. 
14. Id.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Judge Put Me on the List 
184 
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).15 OPTN’s 
function is to establish a national organ registry for both those in 
need of organs and potential donors.16 The OPTN falls under the 
direction of the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA),17 but the non-profit United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS) administers the network and transplant lists.18 UNOS was 
given the initial contract for the administration of the OPTN in 1986 
and has administered the network ever since.19 Even though UNOS is 
responsible for administering the transplant network, the leadership 
between UNOS and OPTN is seamless. The OPTN has its own board 
of directors that creates the organ allocation protocols used by UNOS, 
but every member of the UNOS board is also a member of the  
OPTN board.20  
Although the OPTN is administered by a non-profit organization 
that does not include any government actors, the OPTN is still a 
government agency. It was created by an act of Congress and falls 
under the auspices of the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
and the HRSA. Because the OPTN is a government agency but is 
administered by non-government actors, this raises the question of 
whether the privatization of such government functions is justified. 
Article I of the Constitution states, “All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives,”21 yet this 
language neither explicitly prohibits nor permits Congress to make 
broad delegations to administrative agencies.22 Congress’s ability to 
make such delegations rests on the separation of powers doctrine and 
 
15. It is important to note that OPTN refers to both the actual network for 
organ donation and transplantation and the governing body that creates 
the protocols for organ allocation. HRSA, Board Q&A, OPTN: Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn. 
transplant.hrsa.gov/members/bodQA.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter Board Q&A].  
16. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).  
17. HRSA, About Us: Division of Transplantation, Organdonor.gov, 
http://organdonor.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The 
HRSA is itself under the auspices of the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services. HHS Organizational Chart, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Ser’s., http://www.hhs.gov/about/orgchart/ 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014).  
18. History, supra note 11. 
19. Id.  
20. Board Q&A, supra note 15.  
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.  
22. See Richard J. Pierce Jr. et al., Administrative Law and 
Process 49 (6th ed. 2014).  
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is permissible “as long as Congress creates sufficient safeguards to 
ensure that the assignment will not impermissibly undermine the 
ability of any branch of government to perform its constitutional 
role.”23 Congress may have the power to make delegations to non-
government agencies, but there are some limits within which Congress 
must operate for these delegations to be constitutional.24  
B. Rationale for the Administration of OPTN by the Non-Profit UNOS 
Since the late twentieth century, the United States government 
has increasingly delegated what were traditionally considered public 
functions to private actors.25 In his first term alone, President Obama 
continued this trend of government outsourcing by utilizing private 
actors for areas of government administration ranging from Homeland 
Security to collecting overdue taxes and modernizing Coast Guard 
vessels.26 While this practice is extremely popular today, the courts 
did not always look upon such delegations favorably.  
During the New Deal, the Supreme Court wanted to limit private 
delegations of power by both Congress and President Roosevelt.27 In 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,28 the Court declared, 
“Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to 
exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks 
may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of 
trade or industry.”29 Similarly, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,30 the 
Court held that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was 
unconstitutional because “[t]he power conferred upon the majority is, 
in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.  
23. Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: 
Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign 
Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 331, 336 
(1998) (analyzing the application of the separation of powers doctrine to 
congressional delegations of federal power to nonfederal actors).  
24. Id. at 338–39.  
25. Kevin R. Kosar, Cong. Research Serv., RL33777, Privatization 
and the Federal Government: An Introduction at 2, 32 (2006).  
26. Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting 
Delegations to Private Parties, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 507, 518 (2011). 
27. See Pierce et al., supra note 22, at 50–51.  
28. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
29. Id. at 537–38; see Pierce et al., supra note 22, at 51–52. Schechter 
Poultry examined the constitutionality of provisions in the National 
Industrial Recovery Act that allowed firms in an industry to agree upon 
codes of competition in order to minimize price increases as well as wage 
increases for industry workers. The constitutional issue was truly rooted 
in the fact that the President was the only one with the authority to 
enforce the codes as long as the codes served the purpose of the NIRA.  
30. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Judge Put Me on the List 
186 
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not 
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively 
disinterested, but to private persons.”31 The majority referred to by 
the Court consisted of mining operations that produced more than 
two-thirds of the nation’s coal and employed more than one-half of 
the nation’s coal miners.32 The delegation in Carter Coal was so 
repugnant to the Court because it was not to a regulatory 
government body but to the titans of the coal industry who would 
likely further their own interests at the expense of smaller mining 
operations.33 The Court’s reasoning in both Schechter Poultry and 
Carter Coal suggests that those decisions were not really about 
Congress’s giving up power to agencies but about decisions that 
stemmed from the Court’s fears about delegating the exercise of 
public authority to the private sector. The Court feared that the 
private sector lacked the ability to constrain government actors and 
the decision-making capabilities to act as disinterested parties.34  
Although the nondelegation doctrine rose to prominence during 
the New Deal, the Court’s decisions in cases such as Carter Coal and 
Schechter Poultry are largely viewed as “atypical.”35 The Court has 
never overturned these New Deal era decisions, but, as indicated 
earlier, these are the only cases in which the Court struck down a 
federal law on nondelegation grounds.36 The Court has “thus 
continued to accept the delegation of the power to make rules to 
agencies. Vague delegations that otherwise might be excessive would 
pass muster if the scope of power was narrower, or if those subject to 
the agency’s regulatory efforts were afforded sufficient procedural 
protection.”37 Since the New Deal era, the Court has upheld all 
legislation that it has reviewed under the nondelegation doctrine, and 
the doctrine has effectively disappeared with the rise in privatization 
of government functions.38 While government delegation of public 
functions has increased significantly in recent years, with the 
 
31. Id. at 311.  
32.  Id. at 310. 
33. Id. at 310–11.  
34. Aaron R. Cooper, Note, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency 
Deference in an Era of Private Governance, 99 Geo. L.J. 1431, 1438 
(2011).  
35. Pierce et al., supra note 22, at 52–53.  
36. Id. at 52–54.  
37. Id. at 52. 
38. Id. at 50, 52; see also Cooper, supra note 34, at 1447. The Supreme 
Court effectively abandoned the nondelegation doctrine for good in 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc. Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  
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privatization of everything from federal prisons and welfare benefits39 
to “private accreditation organizations to determine hospitals’ 
eligibility for federal funding,”40 many questions and concerns remain 
regarding the constitutionality of these delegations and how to keep 
the private organizations accountable.  
Nothing in the Constitution explicitly or implicitly prohibits the 
President and Congress from delegating authority to private 
individuals, yet as evidenced by the nondelegation doctrine, the 
“silence in the Constitution . . . should not be construed as author-
ization for unlimited delegations to private entities.”41 Because the 
Constitution is silent regarding delegation of power to private actors, 
Congress and the judiciary must ensure that a delegation of 
congressional powers is permissible. One method of determining if a 
delegation is permissible is to examine the enabling act creating the 
delegation and to decide whether the act has meaningful standards, 
i.e., an “intelligible principle.”42  
“When Congress confers decision-making authority upon agencies, 
Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to 
conform.’”43 An intelligible principle is a standard to which the person 
or agency authorized to carry out the Act must conform in order for 
the act to be a valid delegation of legislative power.44 An intelligible 
principle can be a broad guideline, and it is considered consti-
tutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, 
the public agency that is to apply it, and the boundaries of the 
delegated authority.45  
The text of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), the 
enabling act for the creation of OPTN/UNOS, clearly contains an 
intelligible principle and is thus a permissible delegation of 
congressional power. Firstly, Congress uses clear language allowing 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “make grants for the 
planning of qualified organ procurement organizations” and sets out a 
clear timetable for when certain tasks related to the establishment of 
the agency must be accomplished.46 Secondly, Congress provides strict 
 
39. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 
1367, 1383 (2003).  
40. Krent, supra note 26, at 520.  
41. Id. at 523; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.  
42. Charles H. Koch Jr. et al., Administrative Law: Cases and 
Materials 58 (6th ed. 2010).  
43. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).  
44. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  
45. Koch et al., supra note 42, at 58.  
46. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a)–(b) (2012).  
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guidelines for what existing organizations can qualify to become the 
national organ procurement organization. The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services’ discretion to designate an organization to become 
the national procurement agency is clearly defined and curtailed by 
the language of the statute.47 Lastly, the National Organ Transplant 
Act is also extremely clear about the function and power of OPTN 
once the Secretary of Health and Human Services establishes it, and 
the implementation of the Act has moved out of the initial start-up 
phase. The NOTA plainly states that the Secretary is to contract for 
the establishment of OPTN and that the organization itself shall 
carry out a list of enumerated functions as well as fulfill certain 
criteria.48 While OPTN is given board discretion to create organ 
allocation protocols, it is not without oversight from the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. It must submit annual reports to the 
Secretary, and the Secretary must also establish procedures that allow 
individuals to submit comments and concerns about the manner in 
which OPTN is carrying out its delegated functions.49 The NOTA 
does delegate power to a private agency; yet the existence of 
meaningful standards and an intelligible principle within the enabling 
act bind the OPTN, which is given the rulemaking power regarding 
organ transplant policies.50 It does not create the type of unlimited 
delegation to a private entity deemed impermissible in Carter Coal 
and Schechter Poultry.  
Delegations to private entities are suspect, but the evidence of an 
intelligible principle in the NOTA helps to legitimize the delegation of 
agency power by Congress to private actors such as UNOS to 
administer the OPTN network and to the OPTN board of directors to 
determine the organ allocation protocols used by the network. 
Furthermore, private sector expertise may lend greater legitimacy to 
agency decision making. Delegations to experts can create more 
effective policies, especially in technical fields, such as organ donation 
and transplantation, where Congress may not have the medical 
 
47. See id. § 273(b) stipulates that the organ procurement agency must be, 
among other things, a nonprofit, fiscally stable, already certified by the 
Secretary, and uses process and performance measures based on 
statistical data. Furthermore, the Secretary of Health and Human 
services has very little decision-making power in creating the agency as 
Congress has stipulated nearly every detail, even down to how the 
procurement agency’s board of directors must be composed.  
48. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).  
49. Id.  
50. Id.; see also OPTN Policies: Secretarial Review and Appeals, 
42 C.F.R. § 121.4 (2013) (outlining the procedural requirements for the 
enactment of OPTN organ allocation policies).  
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expertise or knowledge needed to create effective organ allocation 
protocols.51  
C. Constitutionality and Accountability  
While delegations to private agencies may be constitutional, they 
do raise two distinct concerns. First, because private agencies are 
given government power but effectively exist outside government 
control, the normal checks and balances scheme of the Constitution 
does not work to control delegations of power to private actors.52 
Second, delegating agency administration to a private actor raises 
concerns about the private control of public resources.53 This concern 
is especially relevant in the organ transplantation context, where the 
resource is particularly precious, and control over it can be a matter 
of life or death to those on the transplant list. When the government 
delegates the distribution of a resource to a private actor, it is no 
longer directly determining entitlement to that resource. But, to 
whom the government delegates the power of distribution can have an 
effect on access to those resources by program participants.54 For 
example, with organ transplants, OPTN, a private non-governmental 
actor, controls accesses to organs by determining the selection criteria 
for transplant candidates.55 The government’s decision to delegate 
power to and to utilize the OPTN thus has a direct effect on who has 
access to these precious resources.56 
 
51. Krent, supra note 26, at 522; see also James O. Freedman, Crisis 
and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American 
Government 93–94 (1978) (“There will of course be occasions when 
Congress cannot make wise decisions because experience with the 
substantive areas under consideration is too limited and the policy 
questions that must be answers are still too indistinct to permit 
responsible lawmaking . . . . In such cases, broad delegations of 
legislative power to administrative agencies are essential if effective 
governmental action is to be taken. . . .”).  
52. Justice Scalia articulated this concern regarding checks and balances in 
his dissent in Mistretta v. United States. Scalia advocated that 
nondelegation principles should remain relevant when the agency 
delegation falls outside a constitutional check. 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
53. Metzger, supra note 39, at 1396.  
54. Id. at 1396, 1400 (“[P]rivatization frequently occurs in contexts marked 
by relations of dependence, in particular social welfare and human 
service programs. Those implementing such programs, whether public or 
private, gain power over program participants by virtue of their control 
over vital resources, as well as their greater knowledge and expertise.”).  
55. Board Q&A, supra note 15. 
56. For additional examples of how the selection of non-government actors 
can affect program participants, see Metzger, supra note 39, at 1397–
1401.  
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In order to mitigate these concerns, scholars have offered a 
variety of solutions. Harold Krent advocates fixing the problem 
internally by providing extensive guidelines indicating exactly where 
the delegated agency’s power lies.57 Conversely, Jody Freeman 
advocates utilizing an aggregate system that combines the court 
system and internal agency procedures58 while also applying 
Administrative Procedure Act standards to private actors.59 In the 
context of organ transplantation, extending the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) to a private actor, OPTN/UNOS, and using 
traditional theories of judicial review of agency action may be an 
effective solution. This method would implement the traditional 
framework of utilizing the judiciary for review of agency actions but 
extend it one step further to private actors who carry out government 
agency functions.60  
II. Agency Accountability: Role of Judicial 
Review in Private Delegation 
In order to extend the traditional judicial review of agency action 
framework to private action, one must first examine judicial review 
under the APA and the court-made doctrines generated from 
litigation surrounding agency actions. Once this framework is 
established, it can then be used to determine how courts should 
review the actions of private actors who have been delegated 
government functions. Part II of this Note will establish this 
framework and apply it to the organ transplant context to determine 
the best method for resolving the issues presented in a case like Sarah 
Murnaghan’s where a private actor administers the government 
agency.  
 
57. Krent, supra note 26, at 530.  
58. Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Admini-
strative Law, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 813, 846 (2000).  
59. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 543, 587 (2000). Freeman contends that this would be a viable 
solution to the agency accountability problem, but it would require a 
shift in traditional attitudes about the application of the APA, which 
authorizes judicial review of public functions to private actors.  
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (defining “agency”). Traditionally the APA 
and judicial review framework have only applied to public actors and 
agencies.  
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A. Judicial Review and the APA 
In 1946, Congress passed the APA after more than a decade of 
political debate.61 The purpose of the APA was to create a set of 
regulations for federal agencies and to provide for judicial review of 
agency actions. One of the central issues concerning the APA is the 
extent to which judicial review applies to agency actions.62 According 
to the text of the APA, judicially reviewable agency actions are 
“agency action[s] made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action[s] for which there is no other adequate remedy . . . .” The APA 
also defines the scope of judicial review when examining agency 
actions.63 In the organ transplant context, the most relevant provision 
under the APA is that “the reviewing court shall— (2) hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”64 While the APA does not traditionally apply 
to private actors,65 an extension may be warranted in situations like 
those involving organ transplants because the federal government has 
given complete control to the private organization.66 In their 
complaint to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the 
Murnaghans argued that the under-12 rule for lung transplants 
warranted judicial review under the APA because it was arbitrary 
and not in accordance with law.67 Arguably, by raising the APA as  
61. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1559–60 
(1996).  
62. Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations 
on Privatization, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 481, 489 (1998).  
63. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  
64. Id.  
65. Freeman, supra note 59, at 587.  
66. While traditionally known for its conceptualization of Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 476 U.S. 837 (1984), 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), may also be a useful 
tool for applying the substantive regulations of the APA to private 
actors who do not traditionally fall under the APA’s framework. When 
looking at the Court’s opinion in Mead, one may notice that it nearly 
tracks the language of the APA regarding judicial review, as both are 
concerned with reviewing regulations that are arbitrary, capricious, or 
contrary to the law. By using the justification from Mead, courts may 
be able to circumvent the many hurdles that could ensue in trying to 
apply the APA to private actors. It may be easier to apply the language 
from Mead to private actors, as it is simply a method of judicial 
interpretation, rather than to the APA, which is a statutory scheme 
regulating federal agencies. In effect, Mead would bypass the application 
issues created by the APA when it comes to private actors while still 
allowing for the same substantive review. 
67. Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 53. 
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a method for relief, the Murnaghans felt that OPTN is an agency 
subject to the power of the federal government and judiciary, and 
thus the APA applies to this case, despite the fact that private 
actors administer the agency through congressional charter. 
OPTN/UNOS are the only organizations that determine the organ 
allocation procedures for the federal government’s organ 
transplantation network.68 This is not a partial delegation of power to 
a private entity but a complete delegation of power because the 
private actor is responsible for carrying out all of the agency’s 
activities. As a result, the APA should apply to the OPTN because it 
is the only federal agency directly responsible for organ transplants 
and has complete power to create binding policies for the federal 
government. While extending the APA to private actors may be 
problematic because it was designed for government agencies, it is one 
of the possible solutions to the accountability problem posed by 
private actors in government agencies and should not be overlooked.  
B. Substantive Review of Agency Actions 
Another method of using the court system to review the actions of 
private actors operating as government agencies, besides using the 
APA framework, would be to take a more substantive, “hard look” 
approach for reviewing the actions of private actors. Judge Leventhal, 
a proponent of “hard look” review, argued that it is closely tied to the 
APA because the APA “requires reviewing courts to consider the 
merits of an agency’s action” and to keep in mind the rationality of 
the decision based on the record.69 In many ways, this type of review 
furthers relationships between the agencies and court system because 
it creates a partnership between the groups. Under this approach, 
judges work with agencies to further public interests, even when it 
means reviewing highly technical agency decisions.70 Just as “hard 
look” review applies to government agencies, it could easily apply for 
the review of private actors operating as government agencies. The 
benefit of “hard look” judicial review is that it examines what is at 
the root of the policy and its justifications. Additionally, this policy 
seeks to ensure rational outcomes.71 Just like an agency under the 
APA, a private actor would only have to produce enough evidence 
that its policy was not arbitrary and was appropriately justified.72  
68. Board Q&A, supra note 15.  
69. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., “History Belongs to the Winners”: The 
Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/ 
Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Admin. 
L. Rev. 995, 1002 (2006) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 
F.2d 615, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).  
70. Id. at 1003.  
71. Id. at 997.  
72. Id. at 1003.  
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Yet, using this policy would avoid the private/public entanglements 
of the APA because judges could simply apply these policies to the 
private actors when a party with standing brings suit. 
Some, such as the late Judge Bazelon, are concerned that using 
substantive “hard look” review will create a problem for generalist 
judges who are unfamiliar with the intricate scientific issues agency 
action cases can raise.73 While it is important to acknowledge these 
fears, they are not truly limitations in the application of “hard look” 
review. In many ways, the ability of an agency to acknowledge that a 
judge may lack the technical knowledge about its issue creates a 
burden-shifting framework whereby agencies are encouraged to work 
harder to provide judges with understandable material.74 If agencies 
are induced to provide clear, plain-language explanations of their 
policies, judges will be able to make better determinations about the 
underlying rationale for the policy at hand and the likelihood that 
technical language will get in the way of creating an informed and 
properly supported judicial decision will be minimized.  
C. Court-Created Judicial Review Doctrines: Skidmore and Chevron 
In addition to judicial review under the APA and “hard look” 
review, there are also two different judicial review models used for 
agency actions that could be extended to private actors in the organ-
transplant context.  
The Skidmore doctrine and the Chevron deference doctrine are 
judicial review doctrines regarding deference to agency actions 
developed by the Supreme Court. These doctrines have waxed and 
waned in application and popularity with the Court over the past 
sixty years. The oldest of these doctrines, the Skidmore doctrine, 
reigned in popularity before 1984, and since 2001 it has experienced a 
resurgence with the Court.75 In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,76 the 
Supreme Court held that agency administrators’ interpretations of 
their enabling statutes, “while not controlling upon the courts by 
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance.”77 Skidmore’s rationale is the least deferential to agency  
73. Id. at 999 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 
(1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he best way for courts to guard 
against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the 
judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision.”)).  
74. Id. at 1008 (citing Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: 
The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 
Tulsa L.J. 221, 235 (1996)).  
75. Richard J. Pierce Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions Mean?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77, 79 (2011).  
76. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
77. Id. at 140.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Judge Put Me on the List 
194 
determinations, stating that agency determinations are not controlling 
authority but should still be considered in the judicial decision-
making process.78 Skidmore deference is traditionally applied when the 
agency has presented a persuasive argument for why its interpretation 
of a particular statute should remain in place.79 Skidmore deference 
simply allows the administrative agency to argue its case like any 
other litigant, and if the evidence and reasoning is convincing, the 
court will reward the agency with deference. An application of 
Skidmore could be effective in the organ transplant context. It would 
assist judges in surmounting scientific hurdles while allowing them to 
make their own determinations about the agency action, especially 
when they are able to follow the OPTN’s interpretations and 
recommendations as a guide. Allowing courts to apply Skidmore to a 
private actor like OPTN would negate the concerns raised by those 
like Judge Bazelon who do not believe judges are capable of making 
decisions regarding scientific material. Applying Skidmore would 
afford judges the option of deferring to experts in the field or the 
agency, or of simply taking the agency’s recommendations into 
consideration in order to determine the overall persuasiveness of the 
agency’s interpretation without having to automatically accept or 
reject the agency’s argument.80  
The most influential judicial review doctrine, and probably the 
most widely studied, was introduced by the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.81 
Chevron is significant jurisprudence in administrative law because, in 
the Chevron decision, the Court announced that when Congress has 
left a statutory interpretation decision to an agency, the Court will 
defer to that decision as long as it is reasonable. This gave agencies 
greater power to create their own methods for carrying out Congress’s 
objective when Congress has supplied them with minimal guidance in 
the enabling statute. In Chevron, the Court stated that when the 
intent of Congress is clear from the statute’s language, the inquiry 
into the agency’s interpretation ceases.82 Therefore, if Congress itself 
has answered the particular question at issue with regard to the 
agency’s interpretation, the congressional answer, not the agency 
determination, controls, and the agency must defer to Congress’s 
interpretation. But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
 
78. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1240–41 (2007). 
79. Id. at 1252.  
80. Krotoszynski, supra note 69, at 999.  
81. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
82. Id. at 842–43.  
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answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”83 The 
two-part Chevron test can be simplified to mean “reviewing court[s] 
must uphold any reasonable agency construction of an agency-
administered statute.”84 Chevron’s holding is referred to as the 
Chevron deference doctrine because it is extremely deferential to 
agency decisions regarding statutory interpretations of enabling 
statutes giving the agency power. It essentially allows the court to 
approve of the policy-making ability of the agency “in lieu of 
Congress.”85 Because it is extremely deferential, Chevron applies when 
statutory interpretation questions exist that require gap filling by the 
agency because Congress has not directly spoken on the issue in the 
enabling statute.86 Congress may have spoken about what it would 
like the agency to do generally, but it has not provided the agency 
with specific procedures. In this case, Chevron deference will apply 
and the court will defer to the agency interpretation of the enabling 
statute, as long as it is reasonable, even if the court prefers a different 
outcome or interpretation of the statute’s text. While Chevron is a 
useful tool for government agencies, its application relies on the 
supposition that agencies are politically accountable and the political 
process will censure the agency for any unreasonable interpretations of 
statutes. As a result, this judicial review model may not be the most 
appropriate framework for application to a private actor, as a private 
actor does not face political repercussions for its decisions and 
policies.87  
Since the Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,88 
Chevron deference is no longer exclusively applied in situations where 
an agency has exercised its powers of statutory interpretation. 
Instead, Mead illustrates that Chevron deference applies only in 
certain statutory interpretation scenarios; when Chevron is not 
applicable, the Skidmore deference framework should apply.89 
According to the Court’s opinion in Mead,   
83. Id. at 843. This is what makes the Chevron decision so significant. The 
Court is stating that it will defer to the agency’s interpretation, not 
Congress’s, when Congress left gaps in the statutes that the agency 
administers.  
84. Pierce, supra note 75, at 79.  
85. Cooper, supra note 34, at 1449.  
86. Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1301 
(2008).  
87. Cooper, supra note 34, at 1451. Private actors exist outside the 
constitutional framework that insures political accountability; therefore, 
there is no true check on an agency’s policies if the court is willing to 
apply true Chevron deference and defer to agency interpretations in all 
instances for which Congress has given the agency rule-making power. 
88. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
89. Pierce, supra note 75, at 79.  
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When Congress has “explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,” 
Chevron, 467 U.S., at 843–844, and any ensuing regulation is 
binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or 
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.90  
In the post-Mead era, Chevron deference has been limited in agency 
actions where courts can “reasonably infer that Congress would have 
intended to give agencies the authority to act with ‘the force of 
law.’”91 In reality, Chevron deference as it exists today comes down 
to formality, recognizing that different delegations by Congress 
and methods of interpretation by agencies deserve different 
measures of deference.92 For agency policies to receive Chevron 
deference, the policies must come from rulemaking procedures.93 
Agency guidelines and documents interpreting its regulations 
extremely broadly are not likely to get Chevron deference today, 
whereas they may have in the past.94  
In a case such as Sarah Murnaghan’s, where a private actor 
administers a government agency, Chevron deference is the 
appropriate standard of review. The controversy regarding the under-
12 rule for lung transplants is really a statutory interpretation issue 
regarding how OPTN and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services are interpreting the NOTA. The NOTA, as amended by the 
Children’s Health Act,95 specifically states that OPTN recognizes the 
“differences in health and in organ transplantation issues between 
children and adults throughout the system and adopt criteria, 
policies, and procedures that address the unique health care needs of 
children.”96 This provision supports the dual policies for pediatric vs. 
adult candidates for lung transplants. By establishing the under-12 
rule and making the distinction between transplant candidates, the 
OPTN has taken the “unique health care needs of children” into 
account.97 In fact, the NOTA specifically authorizes the OPTN to 
engage in projects to increase transplantation among populations with  
90. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.  
91. Criddle, supra note 86, at 1301.  
92. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.  
93. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  
94. Helpful Cases, Admin. L. Rev.: Pub. Res., http://www.administrative 
lawreview.org/publicresources/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=2&Itemid=4 (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
95. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–310, 114 Stat. 1101 
(2000).  
96. Id.  
97. Id. 
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special medical needs, such as children.98 While the under-12 policy 
for lung allocation may seem counterintuitive to these goals, there is 
nothing in the NOTA that prevents OPTN from drawing age 
distinctions when allocating organs. OPTN is simply charged with 
creating policies that effectively and efficiently distribute organs to 
those in need of life-saving transplants. Some of these policies will 
require that distinctions be drawn between adult and pediatric 
candidates, as these are different patient populations whose needs and 
considerations must be taken into account, a fact acknowledged 
within the language of the NOTA itself.99  
Furthermore, Christensen v. Harris County supports applying 
Chevron deference to the OPTN regulations.100 In Christensen, the 
Court held that “the framework of deference set forth in Chevron does 
apply to agency interpretation contained in a regulation,” but 
“opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, 
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”101 The OPTN 
regulations for organ allocation should be given Chevron deference 
because the organ allocations policies are not opinion letters or policy 
statements; they carry the “force of law.” According to the federal 
regulations governing the OPTN, the OPTN is responsible for 
creating organ allocation policies, but these policies must be 
submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who then 
publishes them in the Federal Register for public comment.102 This 
notice and comment procedure is more suggestive of rulemaking 
procedures than the creation of non-binding policy statements.103 Yet 
while the regulations are specific in the tasks they charge the OPTN 
with completing, they are rather ambiguous about how the OPTN 
should create the allocation policies. The regulations provide detailed 
timelines and notification procedures for the dissemination of OPTN 
policies but leave the actual allocation decisions to the OPTN board 
of directors.104 This ambiguity in the regulations does not mean that 
the OPTN policy should not be given Chevron deference, for lack of 
specificity in the regulations is not a barrier to applying Chevron. An 
agency’s interpretation of the regulations can receive deference when 
 
98. Id.  
99. Id. 
100. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).  
101. Id. at 587.  
102. OPTN Policies: Secretarial Review and Appeals, 42 C.F.R. § 121.4 
(2013). 
103. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586–89. 
104. 42 C.F.R. § 121.4. 
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the regulation’s language is ambiguous.105 The OPTN regulations are 
themselves ambiguous regarding criteria for the organ allocation 
policies, but despite this ambiguity, the actual, binding organ 
allocation policies created by OPTN should be given Chevron 
deference. Even though the OPTN is a third party, non-government 
actor, the federal regulations are directed at the OPTN’s 
administration of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network and the policies created to carry out that network. There 
should not be any barrier to applying Chevron deference to the 
OPTN just because it does not fit the traditional government agency 
framework. The only limitation to an application of Chevron 
deference to the under-12 rule would be a finding that the rule is 
“procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”106  
The Court should apply Chevron deference, but even if it chooses 
to engage in a substantive review under Skidmore, the key issue under 
either deference doctrine is still whether the OPTN under-12 rule for 
lung transplants is justified. When the OPTN created the distinction 
between transplant candidates over and under twelve years old, the 
line drawn was not the result of arbitrary decision making, but rather 
a well-considered distinction supported by the medical evidence and 
the medical community. When the policy was originally created by 
OPTN, the Thoracic Transplant Committee recognized that patients 
under twelve who were in need of lung transplants represented a 
smaller percentage of transplant candidates and included many 
candidates with pulmonary diseases not found in the adult candidate 
population. For these reasons, the committee felt that using the Lung 
Allocation Score (LAS) model traditionally used for adults107 was not 
applicable to children under twelve, and waiting time was the most 
effective way to place pediatric candidates on their list so that they 
would be given “first priority for organs best suited for them—those 
from 0 [to] 11 year old donors.”108  
 
105. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  
106. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 
107. The LAS determines a candidate’s placement on the adult transplant 
list. It is calculated using the candidate’s age, the candidate’s body mass 
index, the candidate’s individual and group diagnosis, clinical 
parameters such as oxygen use, and the candidate’s functional status. 
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting Materials (June 10, 2013), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_ 
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf. 
108. Letter from Dr. John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius (May 30, 2013), in 
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting Materials (June 10, 2013), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_ 
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf. 
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Many of the justifications surrounding the usage of the under-12 
policy by OPTN relate to size issues that are encountered with 
pediatric lung transplant patients.109 “In no other field does the saying 
that ‘children are not small adults’ ring more true than in 
transplantation [since] pediatric lung transplant recipients are very 
different than their adult counterparts.”110 Pediatric lung transplants 
involve unique complications that are not seen in adults, namely, 
growth and developmental issues as a child’s lungs will have to 
increase in size with the child as it ages and develops.111 These issues 
with size also support the separate pediatric listing procedures, as 
there are limits on how significantly adult lungs can be scaled down 
for transplantation into a child.112 Opponents of the current OPTN 
pediatric lung allocation policy argue that “age is a poor proxy for 
size.”113 There are patients who fall into the under-12 scheme and 
meet the size requirements for adult lungs but are not eligible because 
of their age.114 Yet despite this seeming injustice, the under-12 
distinction is fair and reasonable, and thus the OPTN policy should 
be given deference under both Skidmore and Chevron. The current 
OPTN policy may not be optimal, but it is the most ethical due to 
the lack of data needed to verify that using LAS scores to determine 
organ allocation in pediatric candidates or the optimal LAS score to 
 
109. See id. (Typically donor lungs are matched to candidates on the height 
of the donor and recipient. For this reason, transplant candidates under 
age twelve can often only receive lungs from other pediatric donors); see 
also Press Release, OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Approves 
Discretionary Listing of Pediatric Lung Transplant Candidates, 
OPTN/UNOS (June 10, 2013), optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/news 
Detail.asp?id=1598 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (“[O]nly one lung 
transplant in the United States has occurred from a donor older than 
age 18 into a recipient younger than 12 since 2007.”).  
110. Albert Faro et al., American Society of Transplantation Executive 
Summary on Pediatric Lung Transplantation, 7 Am. J. of Trans-
plant. 285, 290 (2007).  
111. Id. at 288; but cf. id. at 290 (discussing that the findings of one study 
indicate that “the overall rate of somatic cell growth was roughly 64%” 
of the estimated rate, thus indicating that pediatric transplants can, in 
fact, achieve somatic growth).  
112. Melinda Solomon et al., Pediatric Lung Transplantation, 57 Ped. Clin. 
N. Am. 375, 379 (2010). If a child is physically too small for the actual 
donor lung to be transplanted in its entirety, transplant recipients may 
receive a lobar transplant, which is just implanting the right or left 
lower lobe of the donor lungs.  
113. Keren Ladin & Douglas W. Hanto, Rationing Lung Transplants—
Procedural Fairness in Allocation and Appeals, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 
599, 599 (2013). 
114. Id.  
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trigger list placement.115 At the end of 2012, there were only 44 
candidates on the pediatric lung transplant list, compared to 1,616 
candidates on the adult transplant list, and only twelve pediatric lung 
transplants were performed in 2012.116 The sheer lack of data available 
to access whether another policy would be more efficient is one of the 
key reasons that the current policy remains in place, as it is medically 
and ethically justified.117 The policy results in fairness and legitimacy 
in allocating health resources, thus resulting in outcomes that should 
be acceptable to all.118 Furthermore the structure of the current policy 
is reasonable because it allows for the greatest degree of fairness 
among transplant candidates.119  
The OPTN under-12 policy is both ethically and medically 
justified and reasonable and should thus receive deference under both 
the Skidmore and Chevron frameworks. Using judicial review of the 
OPTN organ allocation policy is but one viable alternative for 
determining whether the policy is justified or whether the agency 
needs to revise its procedures. Whether or not the policy is 
reasonable, the question that ultimately remains is exactly who 
decides whether or not an agency policy is reasonable, especially when 
a private, non-government act administers the agency.  
  
III. Future Applications: Who Decides? 
In this age of increasing privatization of government functions, it 
is not inconceivable that a situation similar to Sarah Murnaghan’s 
will arise again—if not in the organ context, then in another area of 
government privatization. With this thought and the legal framework 
developed in Parts I and II in mind, Part III will develop viable 
solutions for review of agency actions where the agency is 
administered by a private, non-governmental actor, such as 
OPTN/UNOS. Three possible solutions for a situation similar to 
Sarah Murnaghan’s are (1) using only the courts and judicial review, 
(2) allowing agencies to initiate an internal review, or (3) imple-
menting a hybrid method similar to the actions of Judge Baylson in 
the Murnaghan case that uses judicial review but also allows the 
agency to begin an internal review process in order to make a more 
permanent change.120   
115. Id. at 600.  
116. Valapour et al., supra note 2, at 144, 148, 157.  
117. Faro et al., supra note 110, at 290.  
118. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 113, at 600.  
119. See infra, Part III.A (discussing the equitable fairness issues surrounding 
using appeals to federal courts for transplant list placement).  
120. Order, supra note 8.  
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A. Using the “Only the Court System” and Judicial Review 
As illustrated in Parts II.B and II.C, judicial review doctrines 
could create effective solutions for evaluating agency actions when a 
private actor administers the agency’s function. These models would 
allow citizens to directly appeal the implementation of agency policy. 
In many ways, this method would rely on a process that is similar to 
the state-action doctrine used in constitutional and civil rights cases 
for the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause against private entities with government entanglements.  
Under the state action doctrine, a private entity is in effect bound 
by the same regulations as governmental entities when the private 
entity falls under the control of or receives a substantial benefit from 
the government so that the entity can no longer be considered “purely 
private.”121 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,122 the city of 
Wilmington created a parking garage with connecting retail space. 
The city leased one of these spaces to Eagle Coffee Shop and, as 
part of the lease, also agreed to pay the utilities for the space and 
offered certain tax exemptions to Eagle.123 Burton was refused 
service by Eagle because he was an African American and brought 
suit, arguing that Eagle violated his Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.124 After examining the relationship between Eagle and the 
City of Wilmington, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the 
city’s dealings with Eagle amounted to “the degree of state 
participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it 
was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.”125 
Because Eagle was so intertwined with the City of Wilmington, 
Eagle was subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment even though it was a private establish-
ment, not a government entity.  
Applying a scheme that is akin to the state action doctrine to 
private actors who administer agency functions would bridge the gap 
between the governmental actor and the private entity with 
administrative power. In the organ transplant context, this would 
mean that OPTN/UNOS would, in essence, be Eagle with the 
Department of Health and Human Services analogous to the City of  
121. Burton v. Wilington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961); see 
also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (“It is doubtless true that 
a State may act through different agencies . . . and the prohibitions of 
the [Fourteenth A]mendment extend to all action of the State denying 
equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these 
agencies or another.”).  
122. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
123. Id. at 719.  
124. Id. at 720.  
125. Id. at 724.  
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Wilmington. Under this rationale, OPTN/UNOS would be subject to 
the same regulations and oversight as the Department of Health and 
Human Services, an accountable government agency. A model similar 
to the state action doctrine could bring the private actors into the 
constitutional framework and also subject them to a certain measure 
of political accountability through review by the judiciary, insuring 
that their policies are in accordance with the law.126 Additionally, a 
judicial review regime would allow the court to ensure that the 
private actors are accountable, while at the same time still using a 
Chevron deference framework to defer to professionals who are likely 
more equipped to weigh the costs and benefits of a policy decision for 
the group at large rather than one particular party.  
Conversely, if every potential plaintiff who has an issue with his 
or her placement on a transplant list or how organs were allocated 
can file a suit in federal court, a flood of litigation could occur by 
patients seeking to improve their chances of receiving an organ.127 In 
many ways, the organ allocation protocols implemented by OPTN are 
designed to avoid these litigation problems and the subsequent 
inequities that could result. The allocation protocol insures that 
procedural fairness remains paramount in the process. Using a system 
of judicial appeals for organ placement would, in essence, “grant 
discretionary access to wealthier people, exacerbating disparities and 
discrimination.”128 Not every child’s parents would be able to afford 
the legal services necessary to file an effective complaint in the 
manner that the Murnaghans were able to do for Sarah. In a system 
based on purely judicial review, these children, who could potentially 
be the most deserving based on medical criteria, would be left to the 
mercy of the system. Without any other alternatives to improve their 
chances of receiving an organ transplant, they would have to hope 
that someone with greater financial resources does not use the court 
system to improve his or her placement to the detriment of those who 
cannot afford to use the legal system to the same end. While a system 
that uses purely judicial review for OPTN appeals seems attractive, it 
could come at a greater cost to the poor, it could decrease transpar-
ency, and it could undermine a fair process, which could lead to 
decreases in donation rates.129 On a theoretical level, rigorous judicial 
review may also undermine the expertise of the organization that 
 
126. The wording of the APA and the Court’s opinion in United States v. 
Mead Corp. support this position as they both stress that, when 
reviewing agency actions, judges should be concerned with determining 
whether the regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law. 
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
127. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 113, at 599.  
128. Id. at 601.  
129. Id. at 599–600. 
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administers the organ allocation system.130 Judicial review is a viable 
option for evaluating the actions of private actors engaged in 
government functions, but it is not the best option in the organ 
transplant context. Although it may work for other areas of 
government privatization that are concerned with less precious 
resources, the potential inequalities that could result from the use of 
only judicial review to evaluate OPTN policies are too great.  
B. Internal Review of Protocol Initiated by the Agency 
Of the possible methods for reviewing agency actions, a process 
using internal review initiated by the agency is the least effective 
solution for non-government actors who administer government 
agencies and functions. First, it is often harder for insiders to see that 
a policy or protocol may be broken or that there are other, more 
viable alternatives to the policy available. After receiving a petition 
from Sarah Murnaghan’s family, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Kathleen Sebelius asked OPTN to begin a review of the 
under-12 policy.131 While Secretary Sebelius acknowledged that there 
might be a problem with the policy, her solution to begin a review 
period does not change the circumstances of someone like Sarah, 
whose death was imminent unless the OPTN policy changed the 
under-12 rule. An internal review may have created an effective policy 
change for the group at large, but it would not improve the 
circumstances of the person actually appealing the agency’s policy and 
spurring the agency to start the investigative process, especially when 
that person may have only days to live.  
Except for emergency meetings of the Executive Committee, the 
OPTN board convenes only twice a year. This means that any truly 
long-term change in policy will likely occur surrounding one of these 
twice-yearly meetings.132 These meetings do not offer an immediate  
130. In undermining the expertise and operations of the private agency, 
which has been delegated congressional power, the judiciary may also 
encounter a separation of powers argument. Hypothetically, heightened 
judicial intervention could be viewed as the judiciary interfering with a 
legitimate delegation of legislative power by Congress if the judiciary 
interferes to the extent that the agency cannot carry out the functions 
entrusted to it by its enabling act.  
131. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius to Dr. John Roberts (May 31, 2013), in 
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting Materials (June 10, 2013), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_ 
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf. 
132. Press Release, OPTN/UNOS, supra note 109 (After a June 11, 2013, 
OPTN/UNOS executive committee meeting, the organization decided to 
suspend policy preventing candidates from appealing the under-12 
classification for lung transplants. Candidates may now submit a request 
to the national lung review board so that they can be co-listed on the 
pediatric and adult/adolescent list. This policy will stay in effect until 
July 1, 2014, pending further action by OPTN/UNOS.).  
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solution for individuals like Sarah Murnaghan, unless the executive 
committee decides to take action at an emergency meeting.133 In fact, 
the OPTN lung allocation policy for patients under twelve was 
permanently amended as of July 3, 2014.134 Under the new allocation 
protocol, patients under twelve are “assigned a priority for lung 
allocation that is based on medical urgency.”135 More importantly, a 
patient and the patient’s physicians now have greater recourse if they 
feel the patient’s priority level does not adequately reflect the medical 
necessity and urgency of the transplant.136 As demonstrated by 
OPTN’s yearlong decision-making process, internal review by the 
agency does not account for the timely decision-making ability that is 
essential in the organ transplant context when it becomes evident 
that an immediate change to the protocol is necessary. Sarah 
Murnaghan was not in a position to wait an entire year for change to 
OPTN’s policy. She needed an effective change to the lung allocation 
protocol immediately. Internal agency review does not necessarily 
facilitate swift decision making, nor does internal review account for 
the possible internal agency bias against assertions that its policy may 
be broken.  
Internal agency biases result because “[a]lthough expertise and the 
group nature of agency decision-making can alleviate many such 
biases, it can also amplify some biases.”137 This phenomenon is known 
as confirmation bias. Decision makers who suffer from confirmation 
bias validate an initial conclusion even in the face of contradicting 
evidence or interpret the information they have readily available so 
that it fits their conclusion, even when it does not fully support their 
 
133. It is important to note that the OPTN emergency meeting was 
convened on June 10, after the judge issued the TRO for Sarah’s family, 
suspending the under-12 policy as it applied to her. By June 15, 2013, 
Sarah had already received two lung transplants. Order, supra note 8; 
Press Release, OPTN/UNOS, supra note 109.  
134. Policy Notice from James B. Alcorn to Transplant Professionals, 
Changes to OPTN Bylaws and Policies from actions at June Board of 
Directors Meeting (July 1, 2014).  
135. OPTN, Policies § 10.1, Allocation of Lungs: Priorities and 
Score Assignments for Lung Candidates (July 3, 2014).  
136. Id. at § 10.2.B. Transplant programs can now request that patients be 
co-listed on the pediatric and adolescent transplant lists. This request is 
evaluated by the Lung Review Board (LRB), which has seven days from 
when the request is sent to make a decision. If the LRB denies the 
request, the transplant program can appeal the decision. Furthermore, if 
the LRB denies an initial request or appeal, the transplant program can 
override the decision, subject to review and possible censure by the 
Membership and Professional Standards Committee. Id.  
137. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 492 (2002).  
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proposition.138 In the organ transplant context, internal agency bias is 
highly likely as OPTN is given great deference by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services in creating the allocation policies for each 
organ. OPTN was unlikely to realize on its own that its policy was 
ineffective or unbeneficial. It needed an inciting event—Sarah 
Murnaghan’s complaint in federal court—to realize that its under-12 
policy for lung allocations may not be the appropriate protocol.139 The 
events surrounding Sarah Murnaghan filing her complaint and 
OPTN’s response corresponds exactly to Mark Seidenfeld’s rationale 
for when an agency will realize it needs to change a rule or policy: 
“For an agency to change a rule, it needs feedback that the rule is not 
working satisfactorily. An agency usually will not alter a decision-
making rule unless it faces a crisis that vividly calls into question the 
rule’s benefits.”140 Moreover, it is likely that OPTN members share 
similar individual biases because of shared professional norms and 
ethical beliefs about organ allocation. These shared values may make 
it difficult for committee members to consider how others, such as 
patients or those in the legal system, look at these decisions in light of 
other seemingly logical alternatives.141  
 Due to the problematic nature of using only internally motivated 
agency review, it should not be the singular method used to review 
private agency actions. Yet, purely judicial review may not be the 
paramount solution; it may make confirmation bias worse as the 
accountability assessment inherent in judicial review may make 
agencies even less likely to realize that their reasoning was flawed.142 
The best system for assessing private agency actions is a system that 
combines the most effective aspects of both judicial review and 
internal, self-motivated agency review.  
  
C. The Hybrid Method: Judicial and Internal Review 
The ideal method for reviewing the actions of private actors who 
have been delegated government functions in the organ transplant 
context is a hybrid method that incorporates judicial review and 
internal agency evaluation. In situations where there is no recourse for 
appeal within the agency framework, or where the agency has made 
its final determination, a plaintiff should be able to file a complaint in 
court so that the agency policy can be evaluated for arbitrariness, 
fairness, and to ensure that it is actually in accordance with the 
 
138. Id. at 504.  
139. See Press Release, supra note 109.  
140. Seidenfeld, supra note 137, at 494.  
141. Id. at 536–37.  
142. Id. at 524.  
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powers delegated to the agency by the enabling statute. The court 
system should be the first step in remedying an agency protocol 
created by a private actor, unless the agency has already taken the 
initiative to begin a review of the policy. Judges should be able to 
determine if an agency protocol needs to be reevaluated, and if 
necessary, suspended as it applies to the individual filing the 
complaint. Allowing judges to take the first step in determining that 
an agency policy may be flawed avoids the issues created by 
confirmation bias as it puts the agency on notice that its policy may 
no longer be the most effective course of action. A judge should be 
allowed to create a temporary solution for the individual who has 
petitioned the court, especially in situations for which a timely 
response is paramount; this temporary solution, however, should not 
automatically change the agency’s protocol, as a judge cannot weigh 
all of the relevant factors in the same manner as the agency. In this 
regard, Judge Baylson was correct in issuing the TRO and suspending 
the OPTN policy for lung allocation to those under twelve as it 
applied to Sarah’s circumstances and in refraining from issuing a 
broad-based ruling about the OPTN under-12 rule in general.143  
Once the judge has determined that the protocol is broken, the 
burden should shift to the agency to decide whether they need to 
change the policy and, if so, what that policy change should entail. 
This ensures that the most informed decision makers are the ones 
creating the policy but also that the ethical integrity of the organ 
allocation system is maintained. Using a hybrid method would allow 
candidates to resort to judicial review only after the final agency 
determination has been issued or if there is no internal remedy. This 
approach avoids the flood of litigation that is feared in only a judicial 
review system while still allowing candidates recourse from agency 
decisions.144 A hybrid method also ensures that organ allocation 
remains rooted in fairness by creating a policy that is truly unbiased 
toward the transplant candidates—from their initial placement on the 
transplant list through the final agency determination and beyond.  
Conclusion 
As the United States continues the twentieth-century trend of 
privatizing government programs and functions, the question will not 
be whether these delegations are justified to private actors but how 
the decision making of these private, non-government actors is 
controlled within the current administrative framework of the APA 
and the use of judicial review. Because these actors exist outside 
traditional administrative law norms, viable solutions must be created 
 
143. Order, supra note 8.  
144. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 113, at 599.  
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to keep these privately administered agencies accountable and, at the 
same time, to provide those who interact with these agencies a 
method of recourse when an agency policy seems arbitrary or 
ineffective. Sarah Murnaghan’s case is likely only the beginning of 
what will be a long line of disputes as the United States government 
continues to outsource its public functions across diverse areas of 
government services and programs. Though it may be only the 
beginning, Sarah’s case and the scrutiny of the OPTN under-12 rule 
serve as an example of how the federal government and the Court 
should approach the review of agency actions and policies when the 
agency itself is administered by a private, non-government actor.  
Delegation of congressional power to private agencies can be an 
effective and efficient tool for the administration of traditional 
government functions, especially in highly technical areas such as 
organ transplantation. Despite their effectiveness, these actors fall 
outside the constitutional framework, and there must be a solution for 
how those who are in the most dire need—those who are dying as 
they wait for an organ transplant—to fight possibly arbitrary agency 
policies created by these private, non-government actors. In order to 
face the likely challenges ahead, a system that incorporates judicial 
review and internal agency review should be adopted in order to keep 
private actors who have been delegated government power account-
able to those who use their services. This solution offers a timely 
remedy for those who are in the greatest need of a change to the 
policy but at the same time allows the agency to create a more 
effective and lasting solution that will apply equally to all Americans.  
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